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The Uneasy Justification For 
Special Treatment of Like-Kind 
Exchanges 
ERIK M. JENSEN* 
Section 10311 provides generally for nonrecognition of gain or 
loss on the exchange of property for other property of "like kind." 
Special treatment of like-kind exchanges has been present in the 
revenue laws since 1921,2 with the form of the current statute, in 
most respects, unchanged since 1924.3 Although particular issues 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. S.B., 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1967; M.A., University of Chicago, 1972; J.D., 
Cornell Law School, 1979. 
The author wishes to thank Robert 0. Bucklew, Jr., third-year student at the Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law, for indispensable discussion, research aid, and 
editorial assistance. The author is also grateful to Professors Leon Gabinet and Peter D. 
Junger, who commented on an earlier draft. The article was prepared in affiliation with the 
Committee on Sales and Financial Transactions (Joel D. Zychick, Chairman) of the 
American Bar Association Section of Taxation, but the views expressed are not necessarily 
those of the Section of Taxation. 
1. LR.C. § 1031(a)(1). 
2. Section 202(c)(1) of the Revenue Act of 1921 provided in general that no gain or 
loss was recognized on an exchange of business or investment property for property "of a 
like kind or use,". even if the property received had "a readily realizable market value." 
Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 202(c)(1), 42 Stat. 227, 230. See 4 B. BITTKER, 
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, EsTATES AND GIFTS A-89 (1981); see also infra note 24. 
The nonrecognition principle can be traced 'to an even earlier time. Although the Reve-
nue Act of 1918 generally required that gain or loss be recognized on a disposition of prop-
erty, Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060, regulations 
issued under the statute introduced a like-kind concept in the definition of realization: 
Gain or loss arising from the acquisition and subsequent disposition of property 
is :realized when as the result of a transaction between the owner and another person 
the property is converted into cash or into property (a) that is essentially different 
from the property disposed of and (b) that has a market value. In other words, both 
(a) a change in substance and not merely in form, and (b) a change into the 
equivalent of cash, are required to complete or close a transaction from which income 
may be realized. 
Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1563, reprinted in 2 C.B. 38 (1920). See 4 B. BITTKER, supra, at A-89. 
3. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 203(b)(1), 43 Stat. 253, 256. In 1928, 
minor revisions in language were made, and the section number was changed to 112(b)(l). 
Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-562, § 112(b)(1), 45 Stat. 791, 816. In 1954, the section 
number was changed to 1031(a). Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 
103l(a), 68A Stat. 1, 302-03. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 made some changes in qualifying 
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regarding section 1031 have elicited considerable commentary in 
recent years;~< the nonrecognition principle itself has come to be 
taken for granted. 5 
Nothing in taxation should be taken for granted, however. 
With substantial revision of the Code an almost annual phenome-
non in recent years6-and with a major restructuring of the Code a 
distinct possibility7-a review of section 1031's purposes is now 
particularly appropriate. 8 This Article undertakes such a review. 
Section I of the Article lays the groundwork for the subse-
quent discussion by briefly describing section 1031 and providing 
examples of its operation. Section II critically examines the histori-
cal justifications for nonrecognition. Not all have aged well, and 
some were less than robust to begin with. Because the rationales 
have generally failed to provide a strong basis for distinguishing 
exchanges of like-kind property from other exchanges of illiquid 
property. Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 77(a), 98 Stat. 494, 595. 
4. See, e.g., Banoff & Fried, An Analysis of Recent IRS Attempts to Narrow the 
Scope of the Tax-Free Like-Kind Exchange, 51 J. TAX'N 66 (1979); Brier, Like-Kind Ex-
changes of Partnership Interests: A Policy Oriented Approach, 38 TAx L. REv. 389 (1983); 
Duhl, Like-Kind Exchanges Under Section 1031: Multiparty Exchanges, Nonsimultaneous 
Exchanges and Exchanges of Partnership Interests, 58 TAXES 949 (1980); Guerin, A Pro-
posed Test for Evaluating Multiparty Like Kind Exchanges, 35 TAx L. REv. 545 (1980); 
Harroch, Employing Section 1031 Exchanges: New Opportunities, New Problems and Con-
tinuing Risks, 58 TAXES 136 (1980); Levun & Gehring, Like Kind Exchanges: Is Simultane-
ity a Requirement?, 34. TAx LAW. 119 (1980); Comment, Section 1031 Exchanges: Step 
Transaction Analysis and the Need for Legislative Amendment, 24 UCLA L. REv. 351 
(1976) [hereinafter cited as UCLA Comment]; Note, Income Tax Consequences of Non-
simultaneous Exchanges of Like-Kind Property, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 581 (1980} [hereinafter 
cited as NYU Note]; Note, Tax Avoidance Through Like-Kind Exchanges of Partnership 
Interests, 35 STAN. L. REv. 537 (1983). 
5. An occasional commentator has resisted accepting the principle without questioning 
its validity. See, e.g., Note, Tax-Free Exchanges of Like Kind Investment or Business 
Property: A Proposal for Legislative Revision of Internal Revenue Code Section 1031, 53 S. 
CAL. L. REv. 355 (1979) [hereinafter cited as USC Note]; Comment, The Exchange Require-
ment in Multiparty and Nonsimultaneous Exchanges: A Critical Analysis and Statutory 
Solution, 37 Sw. L.J. 645, 646-47 (1983). 
6. Comprehensive tax statutes were enacted in 1981, the Economic Recovery Tax Act, 
Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172; 1982, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, Pub. L. 
No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324; and 1984, the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 
494. 
7. As this Article is written, Congress has before it several proposals that would make 
extensive changes in the structure of the Internal Revenue Code. The proposals include (i) 
President Reagan's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth and Simplicity 
(May 29, 1985); (ii) the Bradley-Gephardt Fair Tax, S. 409, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); 
H.R. 800, 99th Cong., lst Sess. (1985); and (iii} the Kemp-Kasten FAST plan, S. 1006, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 2222, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
8. None of the major proposals has included a change in the special treatment for like-
kind exchanges. 
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property, section 1031's theoretical foundation is uneasy. The Arti-
cle reaches the conclusion, nonetheless, that a sufficient basis ex-
ists to continue nonrecognition in some form for like-kind 
exchanges. 
I. THE PRESENT STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
The general rule under section 1031 is that: 
[n]o gain or loss shall be recognized on the exchange of property 
held for productive use in a trade or business or for investment if 
such property is exchanged solely for property of like kind which is 
to be held either for productive use in a trade or business or for 
investment." 
Section 1031 is not elective, and a transaction that meets the re-
quirements of the section will be governed by its provisions, re-
gardless of the taxpayer's or the government's wishes. 10 Thus, a 
taxpayer who desires recognition of gain or loss in an exchange 
must structure the transaction to fall outside the section's 
boundaries. 11 
Unfortunately, section 1031 provides little in the way of guide-
lines. It is almost bereft of definitions; it even fails, other than by 
exclusion, to define property qualifying for like-kind treatment.12 
This lack of guidance has left the development of the controlling 
9. I.R.C. § 1031(a)(l). 
10. See United States v. Vardine, 305 F.2d 60, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1962) (rejecting govern-
ment's argument that taxpayer had waived nonrecognition under section 1031 by treating 
property received in like-kind exchange as having a cost basis); Koch v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 54, 
64 (1978) (rules of section 1031 apply automatically); Godine v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. 1595, 
1597 (1977) (citing Vardine). 
11. Section 1031 is applied independently to each taxpayer. It is possible for an ex-
change to be tax-free for one partiCipant, but not for another. Consider, for example, D's 
exchange of a truck used in his business for E's truck used solely for recreational purposes. 
If D will hold his newly acquired truck for use in the business, the exchange will be tax-free 
to him. However, section 1031 will be inapplicable to E because his recreational vehicle was 
not held for business or investment purposes. 
12.. The statute specifically excludes from property qualifying for nonrecognition: 
(1} stock in trade or other property held primarily for sale; 
(2) stocks, bonds, or notes; 
(3) other securities or evidences of indebtedness or interest; 
(4) interests in a partnership; 
(5) certificates of trust or beneficial interests; 
(6) choses in action; 
(7) property not timely identified as exchange property or not received within the statu-
tory time limit; and 
(8) livestock of different sexes. 
I.R.C. § 103l(a)(2), (a)(3}, (e). 
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principles to the courts and the Internal Revenue Service. 
For property that has been determined to qualify, the statute 
contemplates two basic types of transactions: (i) exchanges that 
are solely of like-kind property; and (ii) exchanges of like-kind 
property that include "boot"-money and other property-added 
to equalize the exchange.13 The statutory mechanics of these two 
situations are described below. 
A. EXCHANGES SOLELY FOR PROPERTY OF LIKE KIND 
Under section 1031, an exchange is completely tax-free if the 
property transferred is "property held for productive use in a trade 
or business or for investment" and the consideration received is 
solely property of like kind to be held for either business or invest-
ment purposes.14 Any unrecognized gain or loss is merely deferred, 
not forgiven, with the deferral reflected in the basis of the like-
kind property received. 111 The basis of the new property will be the 
same as the basis that the surrendered like-kind property had in 
the transferor's hands. 16 
For example, if A exchanges a parcel of investment land, with 
a basis of $500, for a parcel of B's land with a fair market value of 
$10,000 to be held by A for investment, A recognizes no gain or 
loss on the transfer. His basis in the new parcel of land will be 
$500.17 
B. LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES WITH BOOT 
A transaction is not disqualified from treatment under section 
1031 simply because "boot," as well as like-kind property, is in-
13. This Article considers the tax treatment of exchanges of property of equal value. If 
an exchange is not for equal value, it may be disguising compensation, a gift, or a dividend 
from corporation to shareholder. The tax consequences of such a disguised transaction 
would be determined under other sections of the Code. 
14. LR.C. § 103l(a)(l). 
15. Although deferred, a gain (or loss) may escape recognition altogether if the new 
property later declines (or rises) in value. See Portland Oil Co. v. Comm'r, 109 F.2d 479, 487 
(1st Cir. 1940): 
Congress in enacting [various nonrecognition provisions including that for like-kind 
exchanges] must have understood the risk that postponement of a recognition of gain 
might result in the· ultimate collection of a lesser tax or none at all. On the other 
hand, in certain contingencies, it might result in the ultimate collection of greater 
taxes. 
16. I.R.C. § 103l(d). 
17. Accordingly, if x dollars of gain is not recognized, the basis of the new property 
will be x dollars less than the basis the property would have had if the exchange had been 
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volved in the exchange. The transaction, however, is not entirely 
tax-free. 
The applicable principles can be illustrated by the following 
example. Assume that A exchanges land held for investment for (i) 
another parcel of land to be held for investment, (ii) a car, and (iii) 
cash. A must recognize any gain realized on the exchange to the 
extent of the boot received-that is, the sum of the money and the 
fair market value of the car (the other property).18 Thus, if the 
land received is worth $8,500, the car's value is $1,000, the cash 
totals $500, and A's basis in his transferred land was $500, he real-
izes a gain of $9,500. He must recognize the gain, however, only to 
the extent of the $1,500 boot. 19 The remaining $8,000 of gain is not 
recognized at the time of the exchange, but is instead reflected in a 
correspondingly lower basis in the like-kind property received.20 
If A realizes a loss on the exchange, none of the loss is recog-
nized.21 A's basis in the like-kind property received will be in-
creased by the amount of the unrecognized loss.22 
II. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR NONRECOGNITION TREATMENT 
All nonrecognition provisions fit uneasily within the theoreti-
cal structure of the Code. The Code expansively defines gross in-
fully taxable (that is, a cost basis). The x dollars of deferred gain will be recognized only on 
a subsequent disposition of the property. Conversely, if y dollars of loss is not recognized, 
the basis of the new property will be y dollars more than a cost basis. 
18. I.R.C. § 1031(b). A taxpayer is generally treated as having received boot, for this 
purpose, if he transfers property subject to a liability or if the transferee assumes the tax-
payer's liability as part of the transaction. I.R.C. § 1031(d). For example, if the property 
transferred is subject to a $100 liability, the transferor will be treated as having received 
$100 in cash. However, if both parties to the transaction are relieved of liabilities, the liabili-
ties are netted, and only the net amount is treated as boot. Treas. Reg. § 1.103l(b)-l(c). 
19. The gain will be a capital gain because the land was a capital asset in A's hands. If 
A were to transfer depreciable property in a like-kind exchange with boot, he might have to 
recognize depreciation recapture. See LR.C. §§ 1245(b)(4); 1250(d)(4). 
20. The aggregate basis of property received by A will equal the basis of the land he 
surrendered ($500), decreased by the amount of money received ($500), and increased by 
the amount of any gain recognized ($1,500)-a total of $1,500. I.R.C. § 103l(d). This basis is 
then allocated among the various items of property, other than cash, received. The car, the 
other property, will have a basis equal to its fair market value ($1,000). The remainder of 
the basis ($500) will attach to the land, the like-kind property. I.R.C. §' 103l(d). The $8,000 
of unrecognized gain on the transfer will thus be offset by the fact that the basis of the like-
kind property will be $8,000 less than its fair market value. 
21. I.R.C. § 103l(c). Thus, loss is not recognized on the exchange of like-kind prop-
erty, whether or not boot is received in the exchange. 
22. LR.C. § 1031(d). 
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come,23 and a sale or exchange of property is presumed to be a 
taxable event. 24 The governing principle throughout Chapter 1 of 
the Code is that gain or loss on a sale or exchange must be recog-
nized unless a specific statutory exception provides otherwise.25 
Exceptions are few,26 and those that do exist are to be strictly 
construed. 27 · 
23. I.R.C. § 6l(a) states that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross 
income means all income from whatever source derived." The Supreme Court has defined 
gross income as "accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have 
complete dominion." Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). 
24. I.R.C. § lOOl(c) states that, "(e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the 
entire amount of the gain or loss, determined under this section, on the sale or exchange of 
property shall be recognized." 
The Revenue Act of 1921, which first provided special treatment for like-kind ex-
changes, had reversed the presumption of taxability. An exchange of property was presumed 
to be tax-free unless the property received had "a readily realizable market value." Like-
kind exchanges were then expressly excluded from taxation even if this threshold for taxa-
bility was met. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 202(c), 42 Stat. 227, 230. See H.R. 
REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B. 168, 175-76 
[hereinafter cited as 1921 HousE REPORT, with page citations to the Cumulative Bulletin]; S. 
REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B. 181, 188-89 
[hereinafter cited as 1921 SENATE REPORT, with page citations to the Cumulative Bulletin]. 
The Revenue Act of 1924, although continuing protection for like-kind exchanges, elim-
inated the "readily realizable market value" requirement for taxation. Revenue Act of 1924, 
Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 203(b), 43 Stat. 253, 256 (1924). The presumption of taxability was 
thus reestablished, probably for eternity. See H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1924), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B. 241, 250-51 [hereinafter cited as 1924 HousE RE-
PORT, with page citations to the Cumulative Bulletin]; S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1924), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B. 266, 275 [hereinafter cited as 1924 SENATE REPORT, 
with page citations to the Cumulative Bulletin]. 
25. Courts have liberally construed the broad statutory definition of gross income "in 
recognition of the intention of Congress to tax all gains except those specifically exempted." 
Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955). 
26. The exceptions fall into three basic categories: (i) continuity of investment cases 
(such as the corporate reorganization provisions of the Code) where the theory for nonrecog-
nition is that only a change in the form of ownership has occurred; (ii) hardship cases (such 
as the special protection for involuntary conversions of property); and (iii) cases directed at 
tax avoidance schemes (such as wash sales) where only loss recognition is denied. See M. 
CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 262 (4th ed. 1985). 
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(b) provides that: 
[t]he exceptions from the general rule requiring the recognition of all gains and 
losses, like other exceptions from a rule of taxation of general and uniform applica-
tion, are strictly construed and do not extend either beyond the words or the underly-
ing assumptions and purposes of the exception. Nonrecognition is accorded by the 
Code only if the exchange is one which satisfies both (1) the specific description in 
the Code of an excepted exchange, and (2) the underlying purpose for which such 
exchange is excepted from the general rule. 
Despite this language, there is substantial authority that courts have construed section 1031 
liberally. See Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting "long 
line of cases liberally construing section 1031" and "courts' permissive attitude toward sec-
tion 1031"); UCLA Comment, supra note 4, at 351 n.6 (noting broad construction of prop-
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Although exchanges are presumed to be taxable, exchanges of 
like-kind property have been afforded nonrecognition for over 60 
years.28 The historical justifications for this special treatment fall 
into four .sometimes overlapping categories: continuity of invest-
ment, administrative considerations, protection against loss recog-
nition, and economic efficiency. 
A. CONTINUITY OF INVESTMENT 
The strongest justification for nonrecognition is based on the 
proposition that, after a like-kind exchange, the taxpayer's position 
is very close to what it was prior to the exchange. Before the ex-
change he held property of a particular type; following the ex-
change his investment remains in property of the same type.29 His 
position thus is similar, though not identical, to the position of a 
holder of assets that have appreciated or depreciated in value. 30 
1. Taxation of Unrealized Appreciation 
Asset appreciation or depreciation is an element in the deter-
mination of economic income,31 but mere appreciation or deprecia-
erty qualifying for nonrecognition, "allowing most exchanges of realty for realty or person-
alty for personalty"). · 
28. See supra note 2. 
29. See Koch v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 54, 63-64 (1978): 
The basic reason for allowing nonrecognition of gain or loss on the exchange of 
like-kind property is that the taxpayer's economic situation after the exchange is fun-
damentally the same as it was before the transaction occurred .... The underlying 
assumption of section 103l(a) is that the new property is substantially a continuation 
of the old investment still unliquidated. 
See also Magneson v. Comm'r, 753 F.2d 1490, 1496 (9th Cir. 1985) (to same effect), aff'g 81 
T.C. 767, 771 (1983). 
30. See Helvering v. New Haven & S.L.R. Co., 121 F.2d 985, 987 (2d Cir. 1941): 
The purpose of such statutes as § 112 [the section of the Revenue Act of 1934 provid-
ing nonrecognition to corporate reorganizations and like-kind exchanges] was to make 
mere formal changes immaterial either for gain or loss; if the taxpayer's succeeding 
interest was for practical purposes the same, the Act wished to treat any change of 
value as "unrealized" in accordance with the underlying presupposition of the income 
tax throughout, that variations in the value of property are negligible unless they 
take form in some substantially new interest. 
31. The Haig-Simons definition conceives of income, for an individual, as the "alge-
braic sum of the individual's consumption expense and accumulation during the accounting 
period." H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 206 (1938}. See Haig, The Concept of In-
come, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAx 7 (R.M. Haig ed. 1921) (defining income, probably more 
narrowly than intended, as "the money value of the net accretion to one's economic power 
between two points of time"). As Professor Simons noted, "[I]t is hard to argue that one 
may grow richer indefinitely [through appreciation in value of assets] without increasing 
one's income." H. SIMONS, supra, at 82 (footnote omitted). 
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tion has never been included, to any significant extent,32 in the In-
ternal Revenue Code's computation of gross income. If this 
principle survives-and there are good reasons wliy it should-the 
case for nonrecognition of like-kind exchanges remains defensible, 
although uneasily so. If this time-honored policy were reversed and 
unrealized appreciation were taxed, however, the arguments in 
favor of special treatment of like-kind exchanges would collapse. 
Why should a holder of assets whose value has increased not 
be subject to tax on that appreciation? This unusual example of 
governmental restraint is attributable to a number of factors. 
The restraint can be traced, in part, to Eisner v. Macomber,S3 
which gave some basis for doubting the constitutionality of taxing 
unrealized appreciation. This concern, although important at one 
time, has largely been discredited.34 If the constitutional issue con-
tinues to play a role, it is more because of inertia than because of 
logic or constitutional exegesis. 35 
Lack of taxpayer liquidity is a far more important reason for 
protecting unrealized appreciation from taxation. The United 
States has historically taxed transactions, not economic income, 
and the Code generally imposes a tax at a time when the taxpayer 
is in a position to pay it. 36 Congress has determined that a person 
ordinarily should not be taxed unless he has taken some step to 
"cash in" on his investment-that is, to convert his holding into 
32. See infra note 44. 
33. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). Macomber held that a totally proportionate stock dividend 
was constitutionally immune from tax. The boundaries of Macomber have never been clear, 
but one basis for the decision was that a recipient of such a stock dividend had "not real-
ized or received any income in the transaction." I d. at 212 (emphasis added). Macomber has 
been read as holding that the Constitution requires a realization event before there is "in-
come" that can be taxed. See D. PosrN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 148 (1983): "And in the 
Macomber view such a realizing event is"Constitutionally required." 
34. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 26, at 69: 
[A]t present, most tax commentators would be likely to feel that the Congressional 
taxing power is not seriously restricted to such an implied [realization] requirement, 
and that Congress is free to treat losses and gains as "realized" pretty much whenever 
it chooses. 
Accord, D. PosrN, supra note 33, at 148. 
35. However, the merits of the constitutional argument cannot be dismissed entirely. 
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), has not been overruled. See Gabinet & Coffey, 
The Implications of the Economic Concept of Income for Corporation-Shareholder Tax 
Systems, 27 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 895, 933 (1977): 
When Justice Pitney fin Macomoer] held that not all economic gains were income, he 
placed a severe limitation on congressional freedom to deal freely with the income 
concept. In concrete terms, he may have ruled out that portion of the Haig-Sinions 
definition of income which treats unrealized increases in net worth as income. 
36. SeeM. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 26, at 70-71. 
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cash or other property equivalent to cash. Without this policy, a 
tax could be levied on a person with no current ability to pay the 
tax,37 thus forcing him to liquidate his investments to meet the tax 
obligation. The liquidity rationale is crucial in protecting the tax-
payer at a time when a tax may be especially burdensome. 
Taxing unrealized appreciation would also present an obvious 
practical difficulty: an annual valuation of assets would be neces-
sary.38 The valuation process would be an extraordinary burden on 
taxpayers and an administrative nightmare for the Service. This 
factor alone is a sufficient justification for the protection of most 
unrealized appreciation from taxation. 39 
The Code does not consistently adhere to the liquidity and the 
valuation rationales throughout its provisions; no coherent theory 
can be expected to account for all aspects of a complex statutory 
scheme. Taxable events are deemed to occur in some situations 
even though no cashing-in has taken place.4° Certain assets, such 
as publicly traded stock, are so easily convertible into cash that 
forced liquidation to pay taxes may not create a hardship.41 And 
annual valuations, although usually a burden, could be easily ac-
complished for some classes of assets; publicly traded stock is 
again an appropriate example.'2 If these are defects in the two ra-
37. One commentator has stated that "income," for tax purposes, "is intended to be 
an index of a taxpayer's current ability to pay tax." Note, Protecting the Public Fisc: Fight-
ing Accrual Abuse with Section 446 Discretion, 83 CoLuM. L. REV. 378, 403 (1983). See also 
RCA Corp. v. United States, 664 F.2d 881, 888 (2d Cir. 1981) ("Tax accounting ... tends to 
compute taxable income on the basis of the taxpayer's present ability to pay the tax, as 
manifested by his current cash flow .... "), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1133 (1982); Schapiro, 
Tax Accounting for Prepaid Income and Reserves for Future Expenses, 2 TAX REVISION 
CoMPENDIUM 1133, 1142 (House Comm. on Ways and Means) (1959) (requiring an accrual-
basis taxpayer to include prepayments in income at the time of receipt "conforms to a gen-
eral policy of gearing tax collection to dollars in taxpayer's hands," as does the principle of 
not taxin,g unrealized appreciation). 
38. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 26, at 70-71. 
39. See H. SIMONS, supra note 31, at 207: 
The proper underlying conception of income cannot be directly and fully applied 
in the dej;ermination of year-to-year assessments. Outright 11bandonment of the reali-
zation criterion would be utter folly; no workable scheme can require that taxpayers 
reappraise and report all their assets annually .... 
40. For example, non-like-kind exchanges are generally subject to taxation whether or 
not the taxpayer receives a cash equivalent in the exchange. See supra notes 23-27 and 
accompanying text. 
41. Therefore, the most liquid assets are not eligible for nonrecognition under section 
1031. See supra note 12; infra note 53. 
42. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 26, at 70; see generally Slawson, Taxing as Ordi-
nary Income the Appreciation of Publicly Held Stock, 76 YALE L.J. 623 (1967) (recom-
mending such taxation). 
'' 
' 
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tionales, however, they are minor defects. 43 Regardless of the ex-
tent of tax reform in the near future, there appears to be no possi-
bility that unrealized appreciation will become a significant 
component of the tax base.44 
2. Tax Treatment of Like-kind Exchanges 
As long as unrealized appreciation escapes taxation, like-kind 
exchanges are arguably entitled to the same treatment.45 The anal-
ogy between the two cases is not perfect, of course. Whether or not 
constitutional difficulties remain with taxing unrealized apprecia-
tion,46 the taxation of an exchange of like-kind property would 
meet any constitutionally imposed realization requirement. 47 In 
addition, the valuation difficulties with like-kind exchanges are 
considerably less than with property that has simply appreciated.48 
Nevertheless, unrealized appreciation and like-kind exchanges 
have a fundamental similarity: in neither case is property con-
verted into cash or a cash-equivalent. The investment of the tax-
43. These factors may not be defects. They can be understood instead as examples of 
a lack of congruence between theory and practice. See infra notes 65-70 and accompanying 
text. 
44. Enq-of-year asset valuation for purposes of computing taxable income is currently 
required in very limited circumstances. See I.R.C. § 1256 (requiring year-end valuation of 
regulated futures contracts and other "section 1256 contracts"). 
45. See Allen, An Analysis of Section 1031-Tax Deferred Exchanges, 10 SAN FERN. 
V.L. REv. 59, 64 (1982) (logical extension of taxing like-kind exchanges is taxing unrealized 
appreciation). 
46. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
47. Twenty years after Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), the Supreme Court 
in Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 469 (1940), stated: 
While it is true that economic gain is not always taxable as income, it is settled 
that the realization of gain need not be in cash derived from the sale of an asset. Gain 
may occur as a result of exchange of property .... The fact that the gain is a portion 
of the value of property received by the taxpayer in the transaction does not negative 
its realization. 
See also Portland Oil Co. v. Comm'r, 109 F.2d 479, 488 (1st Cir. 1940) (nonrecognition ex-
change under predecessor of I.R.C. § 351 (see infra note 92) gives rise to realized gain or loss 
in the constitutional sense}; Brier, supra note 4, at 401 (to same effect). 
When the first statutory protection for like-kind exchanges was provided by the Reve-
nue Act of 1921 (see supra note 2), the 1920 decision in Eisner v. Macomber was fresh in 
the minds of Congressmen. As a response to Macomber, which is cited in the legislative 
history, the Act exempted the receipt of stock dividends from taxation. Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 
201(d), 42 Stat. 227, 228-29; see 1921 HousE REPORT, supra note 24, at 175; 1921 SENATE 
REPORT, supra note 24, at 187. However, it does not appear that Congress viewed Macomber 
as an impediment to taxing like-kind exchanges; the committee reports make no reference 
to Macomber in discussing exchanges of property. See 1921 HousE REPORT, supra note 24, 
at 175-76; H.R. REP. No. 486, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B. 
206, 209 (Conference Committee Report); 1921 SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 188-89. 
48. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. 
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payer remains in substantially similar, illiquid property.49 
Case law and congressional committee reports are replete with 
pithy phrases denoting the continuity of investment involved in a 
like-kind exchange-"paper gain,"50 "theoretical loss," or "theoret-
ical profi.t,"51 no "cashing in" on appreciation or "closing out" a 
losing venture.52 A like-kind exchange by itself provides the tax-
payer with no cash or other liquid assets53 with which to pay a tax 
imposed on the exchange,54 and, if a tax were imposed, the tax-
payer might be unable to maintain an undiminished investment in 
similar property. 55 
Up to this point, the argument for nonrecognition of like-kind 
exchanges is relatively noncontroversial: section 1031 permits a 
taxpayer to continue his investment in illiquid property without 
any diminution for taxes. However, one more theoretical step is 
required. Other exchanges, such as a parcel of land for a truck, also 
leave a taxpayer's investment tied up in property that is not a 
cash-equivalent. If section 1031 is to be theoretically defensible, 
there must be a principle, consistent with the liquidity rationale, 
49. See Brier, supra note 4, who views a like-kind exchange as resulting in no eco-
nomic realization in the same way that the proportionate stock dividend in Macomber gave 
rise to no economic realization. Id. at 401; see supra note 33. 
50. Jordan Marsh Co. v. Comm'r, 269 F.2d 453, 456 (2d Cir. 1959}. See infra note 64. 
51. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934}, reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2} C.B. 
554, 564 [hereinafter cited as 1934 HousE REPORT, with page citations to the Cumulative 
Bulletin]. See infra text accompanying note 58. 
52. Portland Oil Co. v. Comm'r, 109 F.2d 479, 488 (1st Cir. 1940} (nonrecognition ex-
change under predecessor of I.R.C. § 351). See infra text accompanying note 62. 
53. The most liquid noncash assets, such as stocks and bonds, are excluded from the 
category of property qualifying for like-kind treatment. LR.C. § 103l(a)(2}. This exclusion 
dates from 1923. Act of March 4, 1923, Pub. L. No. 67-545, § 1, 42 Stat. 1560. See Brier, 
supra note 4, at 400 (footnote omitted): 
A reasonable inference from [the] legislative history is that the like-kind exchange 
provision, as originally enacted and first amended, was intended to allow nonrecogni-
tion on the exchange or receipt of like-kind property of intermediate liquidity and 
exclude li~e-kind property under the exclusionary clause only if it is highly liquid. 
54. See Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1352 (9th Cir. 1979). 
A Reagan Administration official, in discussing the underlying purpose of section 1031, 
noted that "where the taxpayer has received cash or its equivalent, there is no question as to 
... the ability of the taxpayer to pay the tax attributable to any gain realized." Letter from 
David G. Glickman (Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy) to Sen. S. I. 
Hayakawa (Jan. 4, 1982), reprinted in 9 J. REAL EsT. TAX'N 349, 350 (1982). 
55. See Huskins, Section 1031 Like-Kind Property Exchanges; Possibilities and Pit-
falls, 30 S. CAL. TAx lNsT. 459, 462 (1978): 
The like-kind exchange allows for trading up to new property, using one's equity in a 
property already owned to acquire by exchange another more valuable property, 
without significant diminution in equity as a result of tax on the previously untaxed 
appreciation. 
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that distinguishes like-kind exchanges from other exchanges of il-
liquid property.116 
The possible bases for distinction are not as strong as the gen-
eral acceptance of the continuity of investment rationale would in-
dicate, but a couple are worthy of attention. First, limiting nonrec-
ognition to exchanges of like-kind property may allow 
implementation of the liquidity rationale in an administratively 
manageable way. As a general proposition, the Code should tax 
only those exchanges that result in an increase in a taxpayer's liq-
uidity. But the Internal Revenue Service must have workable rules 
to distinguish qualifying from nonqualifying exchanges. One such 
rule is to distinguish property of like kind from the rest of the 
property universe. 
A determination that two items of property are of like kind 
could be construed as a determination that an exchange of the 
property will have no effect on the liquidity of the two transferors. 
If nonrecognition were potentially available to exchanges of all 
property, however, each exchange would have to be analyzed to de-
termine its effects on taxpayer liquidity. Some non-like-kind ex-
changes would be entitled to protection if the liquidity rationale 
were fully implemented, but the administrative cost in policing the 
exchanges on a case-by-case basis would be too high. 
This argument is elegant, but not without difficulties. Like-
kind exchanges qualifying for nonrecognition may leave a taxpayer 
in a decidedly more liquid position: consider a taxpayer who ex-
changes a parcel of real estate with no ready market for an easily 
marketable parcel. Moreover, if the ultimate purpose of the taxing 
scheme is to tax only those transactions that result in a marked 
increase in a taxpayer's liquidity, there are more efficient ways to 
achieve that result, such as a statutory definition of property 
deemed to be cash equivalents.57 
Another, stronger ground for distinguishing like-kind ex-
changes from other exchanges relies not on formal logic, but on 
56. This concern is not limited to the continuity of investment rationale. The greatest 
difficulty confronting most of the rationales for section 1031 is justifying why exchanges of 
like-kind property should be entitled to nonrecognition while other exchanges should not. 
See infra notes 80-81, 83 & 98-99 and accompanying text. 
57. The statute could simply define those types of property deemed to be cash 
equivalent£, and exchanges of all other items of property could qualify for nonrecognition. 
Such a scheme would serve not only the continuity of investment rationale, but would also 
be more economically efficient. See generally USC Note, supra note 5 (arguing for nonrec-
ognition for exchanges of capital assets}; infra notes 91-101 and accompanying text. 
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taxpayer perception: there is an intuitive appeal to treating the re-
cipient of like-kind property identically with a holder of appreci-
ated property. Even if its results cannot be completely defended, 
no taxing system can or should ignore what seems correct to its 
taxpayers. In general, the more a system of taxation comports with 
the perceptions and beliefs of taxpayers, the better compliance 
with that system will be. In the case of like-kind exchanges, the 
intuitive appeal of nonrecognition has been bolstered by the long 
history of the nonrecognition statute and the continuity of invest-
ment rationale. 
3. History of the Continuity of Investment Theory 
Continuity of investment has been a consistent theme in the 
discussion of like-kind exchanges. In 1934, 13 years after enact-
ment of the first like-kind exchange provision, Congress reviewed 
the predecessor to section 1031 and determined that the statute 
should be retained: 
[I]f the taxpayer's money is still tied up in the same kind of prop-
erty as that in which it was originally invested, he is not allowed to 
compute and deduct his theoretical loss on the exchange, nor is he 
charged with a tax upon his theoretical profit. The calculation of 
the profit or loss is deferred until it is realized in cash, marketable 
securities, or other property not of the same kind having a fair mar-
ket value. 58 
Regulations under the 1939 Code, 59 which were readopted 
under the 1954 Code,60 stated that the "underlying assumption of 
these exceptions [to recognition is] ... that the new property is 
substantially a continuation of the old investment unliquidated," 
and merely formal differences between the old and new property 
were "not deemed controlling." In 1984, the Senate Finance Com-
mittee, while discussing the special problems created by non-
simultaneous exchanges, reiterated the continuity rationale: no 
profit is "effectively 'realized'" on a simultaneous like-kind 
exchange. 61 · 
Courts interpreting section 1031 and its predecessors have also 
58. 1934 HousE REPORT, supra note 51, at 564 (emphasis added). 
59. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.112(a)-l (1940), superseded by Reg. 111, § 29.112(a}-l (1943). 
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-l(c). 
61. STAFF OF SENATE FINANCE COM)M.., 98TH CONG., 2D 8ESS., EXPLANATION OF DEFICIT 
REDUCTION AcT OF 1984, at 242 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 SENATE 
REPORT]. 
I 'I 
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been persuaded of the rationale's validity. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in 1940, stated that such 
nonrecognition provisions have as their purpose, 
to save the taxpayer from an immediate recognition of gain, or to 
intermit the claim of a loss, in certain transactions where gain or 
loss may have accrued in a constitutional sense, but where in a pop-
ular and economic sense there has been a mere change in the form 
of ownership and the taxpayer has not really "cashed in" on the 
theoretical gain, or closed out a losing venture. 62 
In 1959, the Second Circuit, in Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commis-
sioner,68 found that the primary rationale underlying the statute 
was to avoid forcing a taxpayer to recognize a paper gain which is 
still tied up in investment. 64 
Section 1031, as judicially construed, has diverged from a pure 
continuity of investment rationale. Some exchanges that in theory 
should have been protected were not, and other exchanges incon-
sistent with the theory have nonetheless been afforded nonrecogni-
tion treatment. For example, in Starker v. United States,65 the 
Ninth Circuit recently questioned the validity of the rationale in-
sofar as it relates to a transferor's current ability to pay a tax. The 
court noted that section 1031 does not protect a transferor from 
recognition if he sells his property and then, pursuant to a plan, 
immediately reinvests the proceeds in like-kind property.66 The in-
tervening cash step places the transaction outside the terms of sec-
62. Portland Oil Co. v. Comm'r, 109 F.2d 479, 488 (1st Cir. 1940). See also Trenton 
Cotton Oil Co. v. Comm'r, 147 F.2d 33, 36 (6th Cir. 1945) (sale and immediate repurchase of 
oil futures held not a like-kind exchange because taxpayer had cashed-in on his investment); 
Helvering v. New Haven & S.L.R. Co., 121 F.2d 985, 987 (2d Cir. 1941) (purpose of nonrec-
ognition provisions to treat value as "unrealized" unless change in form of investment oc-
curs); Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 560, 562 (E.D.S.C. 1962) (citing 
Portland Oil principle with respect to like-kind exchange), aff'd, 320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 
1963). 
63. 269 F.2d 453 (2d Ch:. 1959). 
64. Id. at 456 (footnote omitted): 
Congress was primarily concerned with the inequity ... of forcing a taxpayer to rec-
ognize a paper gain which was still tied up in a continuing investment of the same 
sort. If such gains were not to be recognized, however, upon the ground that they 
were theoretical, neither should equally theoretical losses. And as to both gains and 
losses the taxpayer should not have it within his power to avoid the operation of the 
section by stipulating for the addition of cash, or boot, to the property received in the 
exchange. These considerations, rather than the difficulty of the administrative task 
of making the valuations necessary to compute gains and losses, were at the root of 
the Congressional purpose in enacting [the like-kind nonrecognition provision]. 
65. 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979) .. 
66. Id. at 1352. 
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tion 1031 although, in substance, the transferor has continued his 
investment in like-kind property.67 
Similarly, section 1031 has been criticized because qualifying 
property has in some cases been too broadly defined.68 As a result, 
taxpayers have been afforded nonrecognition despite an exchange 
that significantly changed the taxpayers' interests in prop-
erty-indeed, that significantly increased the liquidity of one of 
the transferors. 
Neither criticism undercuts the continuity of interest ration-
ale. The theory certainly has its weaknesses: if it is to justify differ-
ent treatment for like-kind exchanges and other exchange~ of illiq-
uid property, it is ultimately dependent for its persuasive power on 
the perceptions of taxpayers. 69 Nevertheless, the theory is not sus-
pect merely because it has been imperfectly implemented. Theory 
and practice could be brought into alignment by affording nonrec-
ognition to transactions with an intermediate cash step and by 
more restrictively defining qualifying property.70 
B. ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS 
In addition to the mildly persuasive continuity of investment 
theory, more practical issues have been raised in support of non-
67. See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
68. The regulations under section 1031 are very generous in dealing with exchanges of 
real property: 
[T]he words "like kind" have reference to the nature or character of the property and 
not to its grade or quality. One kind or class of property may not ... be exchanged 
for property of a different kind or class. The fact that any real estate involved is 
improved or unimproved is not material, for that fact relates only to the grade or 
quality of the property and not to its kind or class. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(b). Comm'r v. Crichton, 122 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1941), has been a 
particularly heavily criticized case on this point. The Crichton court, interpreting a nearly 
identical predecessor regulation, allowed nonrecognition for an exchange of property of ap-
parently very different levels of liquidity: an undivided fractional interest in minerals, con-
sidered real property under state law, for an undivided interest in a city lot and a hotel. The 
court stated: "It was not intended [in the regulations] to draw any distinction between par-
cels of real property however dissimilar they may be in location, in attributes and in capaci-
ties for profitable use." Id. at 182. See 2 B. BITTKER, supra note 2, ~ 44.2.2, at 44-12 to 44-13 
(interpretation of "like kind" as applied to real estate is "extraordinarily liberal, not to say 
lax"). 
69. See supra text between notes 57 & 58. 
70. Both corrective devices have been suggested, implicitly or explicitly. See, e.g., 2 B. 
BITTKER, supra. note 2, ~ 44.2.2, at 44-12 (noting inconsistency of practice in real estate 
exchanges with theory of statute); UCLA Comment, supra note 4, at 365-66 (recommending 
rollover provision permitting nonrecognition if proceeds reinvested in like-kind property 
within specified period). 
I, 
I' 
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recognition. Administrative difficulties, it has been suggested, 
would increase if like-kind exchanges were subject to taxation. In 
particular, taxation would require property valuation in difficult 
circumstances and could exacerbate various compliance problems. 
1. Difficulty of Valuation 
A concern over the administr!ltive difficulty of valuing prop-
erty is present in the earliest legislative history of the like-kind 
provision: the statute, by providing for nonrecognition and a sub-
stituted basis, eliminates any need for valuation.71 For example, as 
part of its 1934 review, the House Ways and Means Committee 
noted: 
The Treasury Department states that its experience [with the 
like-kind exchange statute] indicates that this provision does not in 
fact result in tax avoidance. If all exchanges were made taxable, it 
would be necessary to evaluate the property received in exchange in 
thousands of horse trades and similar barter transactions each year . 
. . . The committee does not believe that the net revenue which 
could thereby be collected ... would justify the additional adminis-
trative expense.72 
Citing the legislative history, some courts have given difficulty of 
valuation as a primary purpose behind section 1031 and its 
predecessors. 73 
The valuation rationale, however, has fatal shortcomings in its 
support of special treatment for like-kind exchanges. First, valua-
tion is not an insuperable burden from the standpoint of taxpay-
ers. Parties entering into a like-kind exchange place a value on the 
property they are surrendering and receiving. 74 The valuation may 
be implicit, but it is made.76 The valuation difficulties in a like-
71. The basis for the current law, the 1924 modification of the like-kind provision, was 
a reaction to the Revenue Act of 1921, which presumed taxability only if the property re-
ceived had a "readily realizable market value." See supra note 24. Exchanges of like-kind 
property were excepted from the readily realizable market value rule, presumably to ease 
valuation concerns. See Guerin, supra note 4, at 558. · 
72. 1934 HousE REPORT, supra note 51, at 564. 
73. E.g., Century Electric Co. v. Comm'r, 192 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1951), cert. de-
nied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952). 
74. This is not to say that exchanges have not occurred in which a party was oblivious 
to the value of the property. It is to say, however, that a businessman or an investor who 
makes deals with no idea of the dollar values involved will find many persons with which to 
do business and will not be able to continue such behavior for very long. 
75. The valuation will be explicit in a multiple-exchange transfer, where one party 
purchases a parcel of property to facilitate a like-kind exchange. The purchase price pro-
vides a precise measure of the value of the property exchanged. See Duhl, supra note 4, at 
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kind exchange are thus of considerably less magnitude than those 
that would exist with a tax on unrealized appreciation.76 
Even more damaging to the valuation rationale is that explicit 
valuation is required in many, perhaps most, like-kind exchanges. 
Whenever boot is involved, the transaction is not completely tax-
free, and valuation is necessary to compute the tax consequences 
of the exchange. 77 Only if the recipient of the boot is willing to 
treat the entire amount of boot as gain will he escape valuing the 
like-kind property received in the exchange.78 Since boot will be 
involved in all exchanges where the items of like-kind property are 
not equal in value, valuation may be the rule rather than the 
exception. 79 
Finally, the valuation argument fails to distinguish like-kind 
exchanges from other property exchanges. Nothing in the nature of 
like-kind exchanges imposes special valuation difficulties, a fact. 
that has been duly noted by the courts. As the court in Jordan 
Marsh stated, if valuation were really an insoluble problem, all ex-
changes of property-not only those of like kind-should be pro-
vided nonrecognition. 80 Instead, the law appears to be moving in 
957. 
The Senate Finance Committee, in dealing with nonsimultaneous exchanges·under the 
Tax Reform Act of 1984, restated, without approval or disapproval, the difficulty of valua-
tion rationale for section 1031. The Committee noted, however, the rationale's inapplicabil-
ity in cases where exchanges are left open until a suitable exchange property has been 
found: 
In such cases, the transferred property must be valued at a specific or near-specific 
dollar amount in order to determine the aggregate value of the properties that the 
taxpayer may receive in the future. Thus, the taxpayer's gain may be measured with 
reasonable accuracy in the year of the original transfer. 
1984 SENATE REPORT, supra note 61, at 243. 
76. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. From the Treasury's standpoint, 
the valuation difficulties are also eased because of the exchange step. The concern about 
excessive administrative expenses, expressed by the Ways and Means Committee in its 1934 
report (see supra text accompanying note 72), can be accorded too much significance. The 
Committee feared that "in these years" revenues would not be greater than expenses. The 
time of "these years," however, was the Great Depression. See infra notes 86-90 and accom-
panying text. But see letter of David G. Glickman, supra note 54 (contrasting cash sales, 
where "there is no question as to the amount of any loss realized," with like-kind 
exchanges). 
77. See Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1352 (9th Cir. 1979); supra notes 18-
22 and accompanying text. 
78. My colleague, Peter Junger, made this point to me. 
79. See Huskins, supra note 55, at 473. 
80. See 269 F.2d at 456 & 456 n.5 (emphasis in original): 
[Other] considerations, rather than concern for the difficulty of the administrative 
task of making the valuations necessary to compute gains and losses, were at the root 
of the Congressional purpose in enacting [section 1031]. Indeed, if [this section] had 
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the direction of requiring valuation in more and more cases. 81 
2. Compliance Problems 
Another administrative justification advanced for continuing 
nonrecognition of like-kind exchanges is that taxation would (i) 
lead to an enhanced underground barter system, the results of 
which would go unreported, and (ii) result in increased taxpayer 
attempts to whipsaw the Internal Revenue Service by not report-
ing gain on an exchange but later, after the statute of limitations 
on the exchange has run, claiming a stepped-up basis for the 
property.82 
Taxing like-kind exchanges would result in compliance 
problems, just as all taxation does. More legal requirements inevi-
tably lead to some evasion of those requirements. But the price of 
perfect compliance is no system of taxation. Noncompliance in the 
underground cash economy could be eliminated by not taxing cash 
been intended to obviate the necessity of making difficult valuations, one would have 
expected them to provide for nonrecognition of gains and losses in all exchanges, 
whether the property received in exchanges were "of a like kind" or not of a like 
kind. And if such had been the legislative objective, [the 1939 Code section] providing 
for the recognition of gain from exchanges not wholly in kind, would never have been 
enacted. 
See also Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1352 (9th Cir. 1979) (difficulty of valuation 
is as great in non.ilike-kind exchanges); Leslie Co. v. Comm'r, 539 F.2d 943, 949 (3rd Cir. 
1976) (following .Jordan Marsh interpretation of purpose of statute); UCLA Comment, 
supra note 4, at 358-59 (multiparty exchanges with explicit valuation would not be permit-
ted tax-free if difficulty of valuation were controlling justification for section 1031). Recogni-
tion of gain or loss on exchanges of non-like-kind property dates from the Revenue Act of 
1924, which renewed the presumption of taxability on exchanges. See supra note 24; see 
also Duhl, supra note 4, at 950: 
81. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 132, as added by the Tax Reform Act of 1984, which provides for 
exclusion from gross income of certain employee fringe benefits. If a fringe benefit does not 
fit within the statutory exclusion, it must be valued and taxed. See I.R.C. § 6l(a)(1). The 
practical difficulty of valuing such fringe benefits as travel on a company plane is apparent 
from the temporary regulations issued under section 61. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2T(g) 
(filed Dec. 18, 1985); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-l(a) (property received in exchange must 
be valued except in "rare and extraordinary" circumstances); Warren Jones Co. v. Comm'r, 
524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975) (very limited role for open transaction method of reporting gain 
because property received must be valued except in "rare and extraordinary" 
circumstances). 
The Internal Revenue Code has for many years required valuation of property for pur-
poses other than the immediate computation of taxable income. E.g;, I.R.C. § ·1014(a) (basis 
of property acquired from decedent is generally fair market value at time of death); I.R.C. § 
1015(a) (if donor's basis in property exceeds fair market value at time of gift, donee's basis 
for purposes of computing loss on subsequent disposition is that fair market vaiue). 
82. See AMERICAN BAR AssoCIATION TAx SECTION, REPORT oF TAsK FoRcE ON SECTION 
1033 SIMPLIFICATION (1983) (recommending that definitions of property qualifying for non-
recognition under LR.C. §§ 1031 and 1033 be conformed). 
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transactions; noncompliance in already existing underground bar-
ter systems could be eliminated by not taxing exchanges of prop-
erty generally. There is no evidence that taxable like-kind ex-
changes would be particularly conducive to tax evasion. 83 
The whipsawing concern is also largely chimerical. A taxpayer 
who innocently fails to report a taxable exchange may, in some 
limited circumstances, have the benefit of a tax-free step-up in ba-
sis. 84 That possibility is inherent in any system of taxable ex-
changes and statutes of limitations. For a taxpayer who intention-
ally enters into a transaction to induce a whipsaw effect, however, 
the nonreporting of the exchange has another name: fraud. Fraud 
has no statute of limitations. 85 
C. PROTECTION AGAINST LOSS RECOGNITION 
When Congress reviewed the nonrecognition principle in 1934, 
one concern was protection of revenue. Had like-kind exchanges 
been taxed at that time, the heart of the Depression, it was proba-
ble that "claims for theoretical losses would ... exceed any profits 
which could be established."88 Taxpayers, after exchanging like-
kind property, would have been able to retain their investment in 
property of a particular sort and report theoretical losses on the 
83. Indeed, the two areas where like-kind exchanges have been most common, real 
estate and vehicle trade-ins, appear ill suited to evasion. Both types of property have exten-
sive recordkeeping requirements for nontax purposes, and documentation is the enemy of 
tax evasion. 
84. The circumstances may be very limited. In determining basis, a transferee of prop-
erty is not estopped by errors of the transferor. See Florida Mach. & Found. Co. v. Fahs, 
168 F.2d 957, 959 (5th Cir. 1948). But the transferor is not free from the effects of his own 
mistakes, and the Commissioner, notwithstanding the running of the statute of limitations, 
may assess an additional tax for the year of the exchange if the transferor later uses a 
stepped-up basis. See I.R.C. § 1312(7); B. BITTKER & J. EusTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 
OF CoRPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ~ 3.11, at 3-46 & 3-46 n.ll5 (1979). 
85. I.R.C. § 6501(c)(l)-(c)(3). 
86. 1934 HousE REPORT, supra note 51, at 564. See Guerin, supra note 4, at 559 n.32. 
The legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1921 reflects a similar concern but with 
respect to all exchanges of property. The statute provided for nonrecognition except upon 
the receipt of property that had a "readily realizable market value." See supra note 24. It 
was felt this provision would "considerably increase the revenue by preventing taxpayers 
from taking colorable losses in wash sales and other fictitious exchanges." 1921 HousE RE-
PORT, supra note 24, at 176; 1921 SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 189. The statute was 
changed in 1924 because of the administrative problems in dealing with the "readily realiza-
ble market value" concept and the lack of a fair and consistent application. See 1924 HousE 
REPORT, supra note 24, at 250-51; 1924 SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 275; see also Duhl, 
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exchange.87 Continuation of the nonrecognition principle prevented 
that result-or so it was thought-for the government's benefit. 
This justification for nonrecognition is a historical artifact. To-
day, in an inflationary economy, with real estate prices in particu-
lar on the rise in the last two decades, section 1031 is more benefi-
cial to taxpayers than to the government. 88 Moreover, when loss 
recognition is desired, structuring a transaction to avoid like-kind 
treatment is generally easy, as it was in 1934.89 For example, in-
serting an intermediate cash step in the exchange has generally 
been sufficient to result in taxable treatment. 90 Rather than serving 
87. Even worse, taxpayers could have structured exchanges followed by reexchanges of 
the same properties. These back-to-hack exchanges, the equivalent of wash sales, would pre-
serve ownership while the taxpayers reported losses on the first "exchange." See Leslie Co. 
v. Comm'r, 539 F.2d 943, 947 n.13 (3d Cir. 1976) (Commissioner argued that preventing 
colorable losses in wash sales was one of original purposes of section 1031). 
88. Guerin, supra note 4, at 559 n.32. 
89. It is easy if the taxpayer has really relinquished his property in the exchange. In 
the most egregious cases, however, where the taxpayer acquires identical property (see 
supra note 87), the Commissioner has another weapon in his arsenal to prevent loss recogni-
tion. Even though the wash sales provision of the Code (I.R.C. § 1091) applies only to stocks 
and securities, he can argue that in substance no exchange has occurred. See, e.g., Horne v. 
Comm'r, 5 T.C. 250 (1945), where the taxpayer sold for $1,000 a commodities exchange seat 
he had acquired for $24,000 and then acquired an identical seat for $1,100. The Tax Court 
disallowed the loss: 
[T]he persuasive fact is that after consummation of the plan which petitioner had put 
into operation eight days previously he stood in exactly the same position as before, 
except that he was out of pocket $100 .... One "seat" was exactly like another .... 
Petitioner never divested himself of the rights which he enjoyed by reason of his 
membership in the exchange, and never intended to do so. Although he went through 
the form of purchasing one certificate and selling another, the result was the same as 
if he had exchanged his certificate for that of another member. 
ld. at 255-56. 
90. It is clear that an intervening cash step was intended from the beginning to be 
fatal to nonrecognition. The following colloquy on the House floor during consideration of 
the Revenue Act of 1924, between House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Green and 
Congressman Fiorello LaGuardia, is instructive: 
LaGuardia: Under this paragraph [section 202(c)] is it necessary to exchange prop-
erty? Suppose the property is sold and other property immediately acquired for the 
same business. Would that be a gain or loss, assuming there is greater value in the 
property acquired? 
Green: If the property is reduced to cash and there is a gain, of course it will be 
taxed. 
LaGuardia: Suppose that cash is immediately put back into the property, into the 
business? 
Green: That would not make any difference. 
65 CoNe. REc. 2799 (1924). See also Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 241, 243 (5th 
Cir. 1967) (receipt of cash removed transfer from section 1031 even though parties intended 
an exchange and, on facts, "result is obviously harsh"). 
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a useful social policy, providing for mandatory nonrecognition of 
loss under section 1031 serves as a trap only for the unwary and 
the ill advised. 
D. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
The last historical rationale for nonrecognition has, as its ba-
sis, a concern for economic efficiency. In 1921, at the same time 
that nonrecognition was provided for like-kind exchanges,91 similar 
protection was granted for (i) exchanges of stock or securities made 
pursuant to corporate reorganizations and (ii) other property 
transfers made pursuant to the predecessor of Code section 351.92 
Nonrecognition in these cases, Congress concluded, "permit[ted] 
business to go forward with the readjustments required by existing 
conditions,"98 by removing tax obstacles to the free flow of invest-
ment capital.94 
The economic argument in favor of nonrecognition takes the 
following form: Taxation is a cost of doing business. Taxes, by po-
tentially distorting the operation of the marketplace, increase the 
likelihood that assets will not be used in the most economically 
efficient manner. For example, although taxpayer A can put an as-
set to more efficient use than taxpayer B, the current owner of the 
asset, B may be unwilling to make the transfer because of the tax 
consequences of the transaction.95 The asset is thus locked-in to a 
relatively inefficient use, a result the United States taxing system 
generally disfavors. 96 
91. See supra note 2. 
92. I.R.C. § 351(a) in general provides that no gain or loss is recognized on transfers of 
property to a corporation in exchange for stock and securities of the corporation if the 
transferors are in control of the corporation (as defined in I.R.C. § 368(c)) immediately after 
the exchange. 
93. 1921 SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 189; see 1921 HousE REPORT, supra note 
24, at 176. 
94. It is presumably for this reason that section 1031 is .limited to exchanges of busi-
ness or investment property. See supra text accompanying note 9. Even though an exchange 
of nonbusiness property may share many of the characteristics of a qualifying exchange, 
facilitating nonbusiness exchanges is generally a lower societal priority. Cf. I.R.C. § 1034 
(providing for nonrecognition of gain on timely rollover of proceeds from dispositions of 
principal residences). 
95. If B is an individual, the effect of gain recognition may seem particularly severe. If 
B holds the property until his death, the basis of the property in the hands of his benefi-
ciaries will be stepped-up, tax-free, to the fair market value at that time. I.R.C. § 1014(a). 
See Huskins, supra note 55, at 462. 
96. See NYU Note, supra. note 4, at 588-89. For example, the Supreme Court has 
explained the special effective tax rates applicable to net capital gains as relief "from ... 
excessive tax burdens on gains resulting from a conversion of capital investments, and to 
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Because of section 1031, exchanges of property take place that 
would not otherwise occur, and, as a result, some hiefficiently used 
assets are put to relatively efficient uses by their new owners. 
Viewed in isolation, these exchanges appear to spur economic ac-
tivity, thereby increasing tax revenues.97 
The economic efficiency attributable to section 1031 is illusory, 
however. The special treatment of exchanges of property of like 
kind introduces its own distortions into the market. Apart from 
the continuity of investment rationale, the classification of prop-
erty into like-kind and non-like-kind categories is arbitrary;98 the 
economic justification for section 1031 provides no theoretical basis 
for singling out like-kind exchanges for special treatment. By pro-
viding for nonrecognition for only some exchanges, the tax system 
encourages overinvestment in property suitable for such exchanges. 
Furthermore, the system introduces a new lock-in effect: section 
1031 encourages taxpayers to hold property until a like-kind ex-
change can be effected although more profitable investment alter-
natives may exist elsewhere. 99 
Rather than promoting the free flow of investment capital, 
which would be best served by nonrecognition for all transfers of 
business or investment property/00 the statute thus promotes the 
flow of a limited category of assets, property of like-kind. More-
over, the statute diverts that flow to the barter market, a relatively 
inefficient mechanism for allocating scarce resources. Property ex-
changes generally have higher transaction costs, for example, than 
remove the deterrent effect of those burdens on such conversions." Burnet v. Harmel; 287 
u.s. 103, 106 (1932). 
The "lock-in" effect in general is discussed in M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 26, at 271-75. 
The effect can be particularly troublesome in years wit.h high rates of inflation, such as the 
1970s. The increased interest in section 1031 in recent years probably stemmed from the 
economic conditions of the times. See Friedman, Exchanges of Like-Kind Property, 31 Tu-
LANE TAX INST. 2 (1981). 
97. The argument has been made most vigorously with respect to real estate ex-
changes and, in particular, the passage of undeveloped property from weak hands to strong 
hands. The "seller" is the· owner of undeveloped property that he has neither the means nor 
the inclination to develop. If he is required to recognize gain upon disposition, he might well 
retain the property to his death. See supra note 95. The "buyer" is frequently a developer 
who will aggressively improve the acquired property, with the attendant beneficial effects on 
the economy. See AMERICAN BAR AssociATION TAx SECTION, supra note 82. 
98. Even with the continuity of investment rationale, the justification for the classifi-
cation is not completely convincing. See supra notes 45-70 and accompanying text. 
99. USC Note, supra note 5, at 371-72. 
100. See generally id. (arguing for extension of nonrecognition on grounds of economic 
efficiency). Full development of the arguments in favor of nonrecognition for all such ex-
changes is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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transfers through use of cash or other mediums of exchange.101 
III. CONCLUSION 
The flaws in the rationales for section 1031 are surprisingly 
serious considering the long history of the section and its predeces-
sors. The case for nonrecognition is uneasy not because continuity 
of investment, valuation difficulties, compliance issues, and eco-
nomic efficiency are empty concerns. It is uneasy because those 
historical rationales at best imperfectly justify distinctive treat-
ment for one limited class of property exchanges. 
Nonetheless, the case for nonrecognition does exist, and sec-
tion 1031 does have history on its side. A like-kind exchange pro-
vides continuity of investment in illiquid property. Perhaps con-
tinuity of investment and economic efficiency would both be better 
effected by extending nonrecognition to all exchanges of illiquid 
business and investment property. If that step is not to be taken, 
however-and it is doubtful that Congress would seriously enter-
tain such a proposal-the intuitive appeal of distinctive treatment 
for like-kind exchanges remains. 
101. I d. at 368-71. 
